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Abstract 
This work presents an extension to the traditional FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis) method to include the effects of human factors concerning 
accessibility/repairability, probability of contact and degree of contact. The authors refer to 
this extension to the traditional FMECA as the Human Design Approach (HDA). All data 
used in this study was collected during the stay of two of the authors at the Mars Desert 
Research Station (MDRS) in the Utah desert, USA. The MDRS is a laboratory for carrying 
out research in order to understand and investigate the difficulties of how to live and work on 
another planet. The results show that following the HDA can enhance the safety and 
reliability of the MDRS. There is still a significant amount of research required concerning 
reliability analysis of the space habitat in terms of the selection of optimum designs, the 
modification of systems, as well as access, inspection and maintenance strategies, human 
factors and environmental impacts. This preliminary study will assist the design engineers 
with the selection of an optimum configuration for space habitats and can be extended to any 
case where humans can influence function of an environment. 
Keywords: FMECA Analysis, Reliability on Mars, Mars Desert Research Station, human 
factors. 
1. Introduction 
There has been growing body of literature that recognises the importance of reliability 
analysis for scientific and industrial processes. As systems became more complex designers 
became more aware of the problems associated with reliability. It was not until the 
development of the V1 and V2 rockets, when Robert Lusser recognized the need to approach 
reliability as a separate discipline (Woo (2017)). The complexity of these rocket missiles 
highlighted the importance of designing systems and configurations which have resistance to 
failure. This requires an understanding of uncertainty in systems and knowledge of the 
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possible failure modes of systems and subsystems. A number of studies introduced the 
concept of „human factors‟ as part of the design process and the reliability analysis (Degani 
(1996)). Methods such as the abstraction hierarchy model, PROCRU and Finite State 
Machine (FSM) theory and its derivatives such as Petri-nets have proved to be helpful 
methodologies for including human interactions and effects into the design process. 
Abstraction hierarchy was developed for the purpose of designing and troubleshooting 
process control systems such as flight controls. It describes the functionality of a given system 
in a multi-level representation that can be depicted as a pyramid (Rasmussen, (1985) and 
Rasmussen (1986)). The system objectives are at the top of the pyramid (e.g. autopilot). 
Descending from the top of the pyramid, each level becomes less abstract in specifying the 
process objectives (roll stabiliser). The bottom of the pyramid describes the actual physical 
component (aileron for example). The abstraction hierarchy is a potentially useful model for 
understanding the relationships between the system’s functional purpose and the modes of 
the system. However, the model is quite limited in identifying the behavioural aspects of the 
system that cause mode transitions and ambiguity (Degani (1996)). 
The Procedure Oriented Crew Model  (PROCRU) is a computer based optimal control model, 
used to analyse flight crew procedures during landing approach. The model assumes the 
human operator as a rational controller who tries to optimize system performance. It is useful 
in identifying the contribution of information quality to the operator‟s decision making 
processes (Baron et al. 1980). 
The Finite State Machine (FSM) theory tries to capture the behavioural aspect of a system. 
The combination of the theoretical and graphical format is quite appealing for representing 
human interaction with computer-based systems. Foley and Wallace (1974) used this notation 
to describe their concept of an interaction between the human and the computer.  FSM 
models and their corresponding state transition diagrams can be used for design specification, 
coordination among design teams and for formal algorithmic checks for design errors.  
State transition diagrams generally cannot represent a hierarchical structure in an efficient 
and clear way. Hierarchy is a common characteristic in man-made systems and in this way 
we, as humans, understand complex systems.  
Finite State Machine models and their various variants have considerable limitations in 
describing concurrent processes. Petri-Nets have the ability to model concurrency, as well as 
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the interaction between concurrent processes. The behavioural aspects of the model are 
denoted by the existence and dynamic assignment of tokens to different locations during net 
execution. Several modifications to the original Petri-Nets were developed to deal with some 
of their shortcomings. Coloured Petri-Nets use coloured tokens to indicate dedicated 
conditions. Coloured nets have been used for modelling the command post of a complex 
radar surveillance system, safety analyses, in particular, where potential faults are identified 
and modelled beforehand. (Johnson et al. 1995) used Petri-Nets to describe the sequence of 
events and decision making that contributed to an airline accident in 1990. There are some 
concerns, however, that Petri-Nets, due to their lack of a hierarchical structure suffer some 
of the limitations of Finite State Machine models. One aspect which is not treated 
prominently in Net theory is the structural properties of systems composed from many 
interacting parts (Milner, 1989). In particular, given a complex system with many 
components and interactions among them, there is an explosion in the number of places and 
transitions, to the point they become unmanageable (Degani, (1996)). 
These methods have mostly been applied to electronic and computer control systems; 
however they can be used for many other systems. The different methodologies are reviewed 
in (Bell and Holroyd (2009)), which summarises the research on human reliability and also 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods and approaches. Human 
factors and safety design relating to human interaction with computers and other electrical 
equipment is presented in (Leveson 2002).  
Human reliability analysis (HRA) attempts to estimate the likelihood of human actions not 
being taken when required, or human actions that may cause hazardous events occurring. 
HRA provides a logical comprehensive analysis of factors influencing human performance, 
leads to recommendations for improvement, supports the safety case, forces attention on 
safety critical tasks (Felice and Petrillo (2011)). 
Commonly used reliability analysis methods include (Hollnagel (1998)): 
• Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), where the purpose is to identify the 
sources of risk in a system.  
• Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOPS), where the purpose is to identify sources of 
failure. 
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), where the purpose is to 
identify the degree of loss of activity objectives – as well as the recovery potential. 
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The degree to which human action is included in the analysis varies for each method. 
FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) and HAZOPS (Hazard Operability 
Studies) are often carried out for the equipment without including the effects of human 
factors. PSA only identifies sources of risk and since the target systems usually involve 
human-machine interaction a consideration of human factors is required. 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) takes a great deal of time, requiring significant input from 
experts, in order to collect useful human factors data (Connelly et al. (2012)). The inclusion 
of the effects of human factors is important where equipment and humans work in close 
proximity or where there is a strong interaction between human and machine. Ignoring these 
effects can reduce the confidence in the estimation of system performance, reliability and risk 
assessment. Well reported large-scale hazardous system accidents including Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl and Bhopal showed the importance of human factors on system safety. As 
stated in Kirwan (1994), current accident experience suggests that the so-called high-risk 
industries (and some so-called low-risk ones too) are still not particularly well-protected 
from human error. The authors descibed the application of Human Reliability Assessment 
(HRA) as a means of properly assessing the risks attributable to human error and for ways of 
reducing system vulnerability to human error impact. 
This paper describes a HRA applied to an earth based space habitat, the Mars Desert 
Research Station (MDRS), in order to identify risks, with the emphasis of human factors as 
well as providing information to designers in order to mitigate these risks at the design stage. 
The method extends the traditional FMECA, to include human factors, by including the 
Human Design Approach (HDA). HDA takes account of human factors which relate to 
accessibility/repairability and to the probability/degree of contact between human and 
machine. FMECA was selected since it employs a closed loop structure, shown in Figure 3, 
whereby risks can be identified and then reduced as an inherent part of the design process as 
well as the ease of integrating with HDA. 
The MDRS, Figure 1, is an Earth-based research station, built in the Utah desert, which 
provides scientists and researchers an environment to investigate new and existing 
technologies, operations, and science in a simulated Martian environment.  
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Figure 1 View of the Mars Desert Research Station (MDRS), Utah, USA 
A simulated inspection activity performed by the authors is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Simulated inspection of the gas supply for the MDRS 
Current FMECA methods do not consider the effects of human factors such as 
accessibility/repairability, probability of contact and degrees of contact which are important 
for manned space programs. Human factors have a large influence the reliability of space 
systems since any interaction between the human and the system has the potential to create a 
critical situation. Repairs or simple random interactions such as a tripping over improperly 
placed objects can lead to critical situations especially in closed environments such as the 
MDRS.  
 
The two main objectives of this study is to extend the standard FMECA method to include 
the ideas of HDA namely: 
 Human factors which relate to accessibility/repairability, 
 Human factors which relate to the probability/degree of contact. 
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The procedures are illustrated by applying them to a critical system of the MDRS namely the 
electric generator. Since the possible failures and solutions, based on outcomes of this study, 
need to be further investigated, the authors cannot provide the absolute solution at this point. 
The goal of the study was to define a preliminary design methodology to decrease the 
criticality of the MDRS generator. There may be many solutions such as implementation of 
the reliability/criticality rank of the subsystem in the production, assessment of its integration 
capabilities, and assessment of its affordance, endurance, and suggestion of integration of 
design standard. Within the scope of this study the authors tried to present an alternative view 
on reliability regarding human sourced problems. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background of FMECA 
methods, applications and major shortfalls and explains the main steps required for carrying 
out FMECA including the methods outlined in the HDA extension. Following this, Section 3 
presents a case study illustrating how the two methods can be applied to one of the critical 
systems of the MDRS. Finally, a brief summary of the main results from this work are 
provided in Section 4 and suggestions are made for future study.  
2. FMECA background  
The FMECA method was developed by the US Army; however, it was widely used during 
the „space race‟ where the method was further developed by NASA for the Apollo missions 
which started in the 1960‟s (NASA (1966)). The FMECA concept developed for the Apollo 
missions still remains as one of the most commonly used methodologies. NASA‟s approach 
to risk analysis is summarised in (Cornel and Dillon (2001)). “Rather than quantifying failure 
probabilities, the agency has generally preferred qualitative analyses such as Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Critical Item Lists (CILs), and Risk Matrices (Bowles (1998), 
Littlefield (1996), Onodera (1997)). FMEA/CIL relies on the logical identification of a 
system’s weak points and of failure/event combinations (cut-sets) leading to its catastrophic 
failure. Risk matrices usually include, for different components or subsystems, qualitative 
information and corresponding scale indices about the likelihood of failure events (e.g. high, 
medium, or low) and the severity of their consequences (e.g. high, medium, or low). These 
matrices are often used as filters to decide which are the highest priority technical problems. 
A major difficulty when using risk matrices is to combine such information about the different 
components to characterize the robustness of the whole system.“ Since the early Apollo 
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missions the FMECA method has gained in popularity and various modifications and 
extensions have been proposed.  
FMECA is a reliability assessment/design technique which examines the potential failure 
modes within a system and its equipment, in order to determine the effects on equipment and 
system performance. FMECA consists of two different analyses, the Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) and the Criticality Analysis (CA). As stated in Shirani and Demichela 
(2015) “FMEA is a valuable tool in order to identify risks including those related to human 
factors”. Their findings showed the importance of human factors in terms of predicting major 
areas of risk. Since traditional analytical methods do not include human factors, methods 
such as FMEA, FMECA have steadily been gaining in importance in a number of fields. 
Using FMECA analysis, effects of each failure mode on system performance can be 
determined. This methodology provides data for identifying root failure causes and 
developing corrective actions. 
After the successful application of FMEA by NASA during the Apollo, Viking, Voyager, 
Skylab missions, FMEA/FMECA was applied over a range of industries such as military, 
semiconductors, healthcare and food service during the 1970s. Shirani and Demichela (2015) 
applied a combination of FMEA and human factors to the entire supply chain of food 
production and they also presented their method by demonstrating a case study. It is stated in 
Tay and Lim (2006) that FMEA become a supportive tool for establishment of risk 
management policies.  Felice and Petrillo (2011) presented a methodology which is based on 
FMECA and HRA to improve railway system reliability and railway transportation system.  
Banghart et al. (2016) discussed some of the shortfalls of FMEA and possible approaches to 
reduce the effects due to bias and team dynamics, lack of validation and the subjective nature 
of estimating Risk Priority Numbers. In the paper the authors discuss methods to reducing 
expert bias/subjectivity including the application of a thorough review process, as well as a 
team-based approach.  The authors report that research-based validation of FMEA value and 
effectiveness is severely lacking, as are conclusive recommendations for improvement of the 
process, in terms of the human factor. They also highlighted a number of studies  
(Konstandinidou et al. (2006), Shebl et al. (2009), Phipps et al. (2008), Apkon et al. (2004), 
Lyons et al. (2004)) where there were significant discrepancies between the severity ratings 
selected by different groups as well as the lack of correlation of risks identified. 
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The Risk Priority Number (RPN) in FMEA is a method aimed at ranking and prioritizing 
failure modes – in order to develop mitigation strategies and reduce the overall consequences 
of the failure mode occurring. Banghart et al. (2016) discusses a number of shortfalls of RPN 
including issues surrounding the combination of Severity (S) by probability of occurrence (O) 
and detectability (D) values:   
• Holes in the scale.  The RPN scale is not continuous and various numbers between 1 
and 1000 cannot be formed by the product of S, O and D.  This is specifically evident in 
higher numbers (600+).  Only 120 unique numbers can be formed with 88 % of the range 
empty. 
• Duplication of RPNs.  RPNs can be formed with many combinations of S, O and D 
thus making the inaccurate assumption that each factor is equally important. 
• Sensitivity to small changes.  The RPN can be affected significantly by a small change 
in one factor, especially if the other factors are large numbers. 
• Utilizing a single dimension RP encourages management to set arbitrary unrealistic 
thresholds (Bowles (2003)). 
Basic guidelines for the FMECA study are outlined in the Military procedure - Procedure for 
Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (MIL-STD-1629A). Since 
FMECA provides important information for maintainability, safety and logistics analysis, 
researchers have also used the method to enhance the quality of existing systems.  
The main steps involved with FMECA are shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 Main steps of traditional FMECA 
Kmenta (2002) described the FMECA process as a number of district phases. The different 
phases, the necessary questions for these phases and the outputs of each phase, are illustrated 
in Table 1. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Table 1 FMECA Phases adopted from (Kmenta, 2002) 
Phase Question Output FMECA step 
(Figure 3) 
Identify What can go wrong? 
Failure descriptions 
Causes Failure Modes Effects 
2,3,4 
Analyse 
How likely is a failure? 
What are the consequences? 
Failure rates 
RPN=Risk Priority Number 
5 
Act 
What can be done? 
How can we eliminate the cause? 
How can we reduce the severity? 
Design solutions 
Test plans 
Manufacturing changes 
Error proofing, etc. 
6 
 
The necessary steps for carrying out FMECA analysis are shown in Table 2. The extended 
human factor considerations such as accessibility and human machine interactions not 
included in the traditional approach are highlighted. 
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Table 2 FMECA and HDA Steps 
Main Steps Sub steps Description  
1. System selection 
and analysis level. 
System selection 
The selection is based on data availability,expert judgement and the importance of 
system/subsystem to future development.  
Establishing level 
of analysis 
System/subsystems can be divided into smaller parts e.g. radio to speaker, electric main 
board, power supply etc.  
2. Gathering 
information about 
targeted systems 
Functional analysis Gathering information about functionality of each system and subsystem 
Possible failure 
modes 
Identification of the failure modes of each system and subsystem 
Connections to 
other systems 
Establish the connections and interactions and dependences between systems and 
subsystems. Each system is analysed as a separate part and also, as a part of a larger system 
Assembly logic of 
systems 
The assembly approach (how each subsystem is assembled into a system) can change the 
criticality of system. This information is necessary as part of the human factor assessment 
Obtaining human 
factor modifiers 
A series of factors describing accessibility/repairability and human interaction with the 
system/subsystem are established 
3. Gathering 
information about 
environmental 
conditions 
Environmental 
conditions  
Each system and subsystem is required to operate over rage of different environmental 
conditions such as vibration, temperature, humidity, pressure etc. Operating within 
prescribed conditions is vital for functionality of the given system 
Running time  
Predict the operational time requirements for the each system and subsystem based on 
previous related research combined with expert knowledge 
4. Criticality 
assessment 
Identification of 
failures and 
consequences 
An assessment of failure modes and consequences of failure e.g. catastrophic, critical, 
marginal or minor is carried out for each system and subsystem 
Probability of 
system failure 
Probability of failure is determined for each system/subsystem based on literature [6, 8, and 
9] and expert knowledge 
5. Assessment of 
system 
modification, 
accessibility and 
human interaction 
Modification 
assessment 
Systems and subsystems are interconnected. Design changes must be assessed to determine if 
changes in one subsystem lead to fundamental changes in the functionality of the system.   
Repairability 
The effect of design changes on aspects of repairability in particular accessibility must be 
assessed 
Human interaction 
The effect of design changes on aspects of human interaction must be assessed e.g. how the 
design/modification influence human behaviour and vice versa.  
6. Modifying 
criticality 
assessment to 
include human 
factors 
Determining the 
probability of 
system failure with 
human interaction 
Consideration of  the modification of probability of failures based on different human 
interactions. This includes modification of criticality of system based on human interaction. 
 
3. Case study – MDRS Electric Generator 
3.1 Developed Methodology 
In this paper, the standard FMECA method is extended to include the effect of human behaviour 
on the design process by applying a Human Design Approach (HDA). The easy to implement 
approach provides an estimate of the probability of failure due to human interaction by combining 
both the probability and the degrees of contact as well as reflecting the accessibility degree of a 
given part i.e. how easy it is for a human to access part of a system.  In a similar manner to 
evaluating risk priority numbers (RPN) in the standard FMEA (Failure mode effects analysis) the 
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HDA also requires subjective input from experts in order to quantify the various probabilities 
which is a well-known weakness of such methods. 
In order to improve the reliability of the MDRS electric generator possible failures caused by 
human interactions were investigated. This study demonstrated the importance of including 
the effects of human interactions on the MDRS system components using an extended 
FMECA analysis.  
It would be interesting to extend the work by including, for example, more human 
interactions and greater subsystem detail in order to investigate the efficacy of the relatively 
crude model used in this study as well as investigating the effects of applying reported 
methods in order to reduce subjectivity. 
Failure modes, probabilities of failure occurrence and accessibility degrees of the selected MDRS 
systems are presented in this section. Since almost everything on MDRS requires electrical power, 
the generator set is selected as the most important system. This study includes only sub-assemblies 
since there was no data available for a deeper analysis at individual component level. The main 
sub-assemblies of the electric generator are the diesel engine, exhaust and starting battery shown 
in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 MDRS Generator 
3.2 Failure occurrence and failure modes 
The probabilities of failure occurrence and failure modes are based on the approaches outlined in 
(MIL-STD-1629A, (1980), MIL-HDBK-217F, (1990), FMD-91, (1991)). The probability of 
failure occurrence levels is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Probability of failure occurrence levels (frequency) (FMECA, 1993) 
Level Frequency 
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A Frequent  
B Resonably probable 
C Occasional 
D Remote 
E Extremely Unlikely 
 
3.3 Accessibility 
The accessibility degree of a given part, i.e. how easy it is for a human to access the part with 
a given failure mode, is divided into four classifications shown in Table 4. Accessibility is 
closely linked to repairability. 
Table 4 Accessibility degree classification 
Accessibility Degree Accessibility 
1 Completely accessible  
2 Accessible with minor difficulties 
3 Accessible with major difficulties 
4 Completely inaccessible 
 
The authors propose four classifications to represent accessibility. The first classification 
represents failure modes on parts which are completely accessible. This means that the 
selected failure mode of the part can be easily accessed and repaired with tools or easily 
replaced with a new part. This often represents parts which are usually outside of the given 
machine. Typical examples would be batteries in a remote control or battery in a personal 
laptop, where the failure mode would be shorted battery or old battery.  
The second classification represents failure modes where the access is difficult or the failure 
mode of given part means it is not easily repairable. An example could be the failure of a 
glow plug in the generator engine as changing the plug may be problematic due to constricted 
access as shown in Table 5. 
The third classification represents a failure mode where access is very difficult or special 
tools are required to replace/repair the part. An example could include failure of the electrical 
starter motor of a combustion engine requiring replacing the starter or one of its components. 
A typical location for the starter would be behind the battery as it is seen in Figure 4. The 
replacement of the starter requires removing the battery and then removing the starter. The 
process is problematic due to the severely restricted space as well as interference from 
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numerous electric cables. This demonstrates a double point failure as the repairperson can 
make a mistake in removing battery or starter causing other damage to the system. 
The last classification represents a failure mode where repair or replacement is not possible. 
An example failure mode would be a piston crack inside the combustion engine. In order to 
replace the piston, it is necessary to dismantle the whole engine and replace the piston. This 
represents a multiple point failure as the repair person has to dismantle other parts of engine 
and each part has possible failure in itself. Inaccessibility problems also occur due to poorly 
placed fasteners which cannot be accessed and are required to be untied in order to replace 
the part. Problems can be introduced by the assembly process carried out during 
manufacturing such as where the machine is assembled and then a protective cover is welded 
over it. After the welding process, the machine becomes a single failure problem as one 
failure is enough to lead to the replacement of the whole machine.  
3.3.1 Accessibility matrix 
Once failure modes and occurrence levels (from traditional FMECA), and accessibility (from 
HDA) are established, the „accessibility matrix‟ can be constructed for each sub-assembly of the 
MDRS generator as shown in Table 6. 
Table 5 Failure modes, failure occurrences and accessibilities of the MDRS generator 
FMECA HDA 
 
Part Label Failure mode 
Probability of failure 
occurrence 
Accessibility degree 
 
ENGINE 
 
 
 
GEN_E1 Mechanical D 4 
 GEN_E2 Loss of Control D 2 
 GEN_E3 Cooling System C 3 
G 
E 
N 
E 
R 
A 
T 
O 
R 
GEN_E4 Air and Fuel System C 3 
GEN_E5 Electrical  D 2 
GEN_E6 Seal/Gasket  C 4 
GEN_E7 Lubricating System  D 4 
EXHAUST 
 
GEN_X1 Gasket Leak B 3 
GEN_X2 Burst/Ruptured B 3 
GEN_X3 Incorrect Fitting  D 3 
BATTERY 
 
 
 
GEN_B1 Degraded Output C 1 
GEN_B2 Worn C 1 
 GEN_B3 No Output D 1 
 GEN_B4 Connector  D 1 
 GEN_B5 Short circuit D 1 
 GEN_B6 Leaking E 1 
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Table 5 indicates that most inaccessible parts are in the diesel engine (GEN_E1, GEN_E6 
and GEN_E7) showing that the current design is not suitable for carrying out repairs due to 
poor accessibility. If there is a failure of the engine, the process of repairs could be very 
problematic. Repairs to the exhaust system could also be problematic due to the relatively 
poor accessibility. On the other hand, it can be clearly seen that the battery is easily 
accessible. Table 6 shows the probability of failure occurrence (from FMECA) in relation to 
accessibility (from HDA).  The table highlights problematic parts by combining accessibility 
and failure occurrence levels.  
 
Table 6 Failure occurrence and Accessibility 
Probability 
 of failure 
occurence 
Label 
A     
B   GEN_X1 GEN_X2  
C GEN_B1 GEN_B2  GEN_E3 GEN_E4 GEN_E6 
D GEN_B3 GEN_B4 GEN_B5 
GEN_E5
GEN_E2 
GEN_X3 GEN_E1   GEN_E7 
E GEN_B6    
Accessibility 1 2 3 4  
 
The authors observed that the rather coarse accessibility scale (1 to 4) is capable of catching 
all the major issues relating to MDRS generator design. Nevertheless Table 6 shows that of 
the three most inaccessible parts,  mechanical failure and engine lubricating system (GEN_E1 
and GEN_E7) have only remote failure occurrence levels while (GEN_E6) seals/gasket fail 
occasionally.  
Highest failure rates occur for exhaust parts (GEN_X1 and GEN_X2) which have relatively 
poor accessibility. There are no parts of the generator where there is high probability of 
failure combined with no access. 
3.4 Probability and Degrees of contact 
The second aspect of the HDA concerns degrees and probability of contact which describes 
the probability of a human interacting with a part. The first step is to define how each part 
can be in contact with human operator (degrees of contact). It is clear that a part or unit which 
is hidden behind a cover is less likely to come into contact with a human than a part which is 
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in the open. For each degree of contact there is associated probability of contact as illustrated 
in Table 7 which is based on Risk Management Probability Definitions relating to probability 
of occurrence. These probabilities are defined over the predicted life time of given part 
(Engert and Lansdowne (1999)).  
Table 7 Probabilities and degrees of contacts (Engert and Lansdowne (1999)) 
Degrees of 
contact 
Probability of 
contact 
Description 
1 0.00 - 0.10 Almost impossible to interact with human 
2 0.11 - 0.40 Unlikely that human can be  interact with part 
3 0.41 - 0.60 It is likely that human can be interact with part 
4 0.61 - 0.90 Highly probable that human can be interact with part 
5 0.91 - 1.00 Almost certain that part can be interact with human 
The first degree of contact represents a part behind a cover or some sort of protection. This 
could be a button behind a glass, where it is necessary to break the glass to touch the button 
or a battery which is completely enclosed by a cover. It should be noted that the cover needs 
to be handled first in order to get into the battery. The reader should bear in mind that there is 
still some minimal probability that human can interact with the part. Even when a part is 
behind a protective cover there is still possibility of damage due to human interaction, e.g. 
impact with heavy object during transportation.  
The second degree of contact represents a part which can be directly accessed by a human, 
but it is still well covered by the environment. An example would be a control panel. The 
third degree represents an object which is partly covered but allows possible interaction with 
a human such as the exhaust. The fourth degree of contact represents an object which lies in 
path of the human, but it is clearly visible, i.e. the object is in visual range, or the human is 
constantly aware of the object. The last degree represents a part where there is a high 
probability of human interaction.  
3.5 Failure modes due to human interaction 
This section describes two basic failure modes due to human interaction. The first mode 
accounts for failures due to accidental human interaction such as a cup of coffee spilled on a 
keyboard. The second failure mode accounts for failures due to improper human operation 
such as using excessive force on a part and breaking it. This also includes, improper 
“playing” or „fiddling‟ such as described in (Finch and Cameron (1955)) with a part: humans 
have a tendency “to play” with parts which are freely accessible. An example is the 
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accidental damage (mode 1) to the fire extinguisher bracket shown in Figure 5 caused by a 
worker  improperly leaning on it (mode 2) while talking to a co-worker.  
 
Figure 5 Damaged fire extinguisher bracket on the MDRS 
In the frame of this study, accidental interaction and improper manipulation are considered as 
human factors each of which has an associated probability of appearance.  The probability of 
appearance, a subjective value obtained from expert opinion, is the probability that a 
particular human factor will occur in a subsystem. It is important to note that since the sum of 
probabilities of appearance for each sub-system is one, adding more human factors tends to 
reduce the probability of appearance of a particular human factor. 
Here the authors define the probability of accident which is the product of probability of 
appearance and probability of contact as shown in equation (1).  
Paccident=Pcontact*Pappearance                                                                                                                                                          (1) 
Table 8 shows the generator subsystems and the human factors relating to each subsystem. It 
also shows how the probability of accident is determined for each human factor. The mid-
range of the probability of contact values in Table 7 were combined with probability of 
appearance values in order to calculate the probability of accident for each human factor in 
the subsystem.   
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Table 8 Results for human interactions with the generator 
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ENGINE 
HEN1 Accidental interaction - cover damaged 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.389 4 0.7 0.272 1 
HEN2 
Accidental interaction - damage to fuel 
box 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.389 4 0.7 0.272 3 
HEN3 
Improper operation  - impact due to 
transportation 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.111 4 0.7 0.078 4 
HEN4 
Accidental interaction – electric cables 
and fuel pipes. 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.056 4 0.7 0.039 3 
HEN5 
Improper operation - control panel 
damaged and inoperable 
Mechanical and 
Electrical damage  
0.056 4 0.7 0.039 4 
EXHAUST  
HEP1 
Accidental interaction -  silencer 
damage due to impact 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.273 3 0.45 0.123 2 
HEP2 
Accidental interaction- silencer loss due 
to impact 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.136 3 0.45 0.061 3 
HEP3 
Accidental interaction - pipe damage 
due to impact causes gas  leakage 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.364 3 0.45 0.164 2 
HEP4 
Accidental interaction - pipe damage 
due to impact - hole and gas leakage 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.227 3 0.45 0.102 3 
BATTERY 
HBA1 Improper operation - battery shorted Electrical damage 0.262 5 0.95 0.249 4 
HBA2 Improper operation  - terminal damage Electrical damage 0.033 5 0.95 0.031 3 
HBA3 
Accidental interaction - battery loss due 
to impact 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.164 5 0.95 0.156 4 
HBA4 
Accidental interaction - battery leakage 
of acid 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.230 5 0.95 0.219 4 
HBA5 
Accidental interaction - terminal 
damage due to human. 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.311 5 0.95 0.295 3 
BATTERY 
CABLE 
HBAc1 Accidental interaction - cable break 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.360 5 0.95 0.342 4 
HBAc2 Accidental interaction - cable damaged 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.520 5 0.95 0.494 4 
HBAc3 
Improper manipulation - cable is 
damaged 
Mechanical 
damage 
0.120 5 0.95 0.114 4 
 
The degree of severity is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 Severity Levels (FMECA, 1993) 
Level Severity 
1 Catastrophic 
2 Critical 
3 Marginal 
4 Minor 
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The relationship between the percentage probability of accident (from HDA) and the degree 
of severity (from FMECA) is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 Probability of accident and severity 
Probability of  
accident (%) 
Label 
50    HBAc2, HBAc1 
30   HBA5 HBA4, HBA1 
20  HEP3, HEP1 HEP4, HEN2, HEN1 HBAc3, HBA3 
10   HBA2,HEP2,HEN4 HEN5,HEN3 
Severity 1 2 3 4 
 
Table 10 shows that the probability of interaction with the battery and cables is high but the 
severity is relatively low. The table also indicates that accidental interaction causing silencer 
damage due to impact (HEP1) and accidental interaction causing pipe damage and leakage of 
gas (HEP3) are the most severe human interaction conditions. It is worth noting that the 
results of the accessibility study in Section 3.3.1 also concluded that the exhaust was 
problematic, having the highest failure rates combined with relatively poor accessibility.  
4. Discussion 
This paper describes an easy to implement method named the Human Design Approach 
(HDA) which is an extension to the traditional FMECA method. HDA considers human 
factors concerning accessibility as well as human-machine interactions described by 
probability of contact.  
The first part of HDA allows the relationship between accessibility (HDA) and probability of 
failure occurrence (FMECA) to be investigated which the authors titled „the accessibility 
matrix‟. This can be used to highlight problematic parts which may have relatively high 
failure occurrence combined with poor accessibility. This has major consequences of 
repairability and may also indicate that design changes are required. 
The second part of HDA allows the relationship between probability of accident (HDA) and 
severity (FMECA) to be established. The authors introduce the term probability of accident 
which is found by combining probability of appearance (FMECA) with probability of contact 
(HDA). This can be used to highlight parts which may have relatively high probability of 
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accident combined with high severity. Such parts will have a detrimental effect on overall 
reliability and will require to be redesigned. 
The HDA approach was applied to a critical system on the Mars Desert Research Station 
(MDRS) namely the electric generator. The number of human interactions was limited to 
five, the machine subsystem level was just one, giving a relatively crude model and the 
generator used in an actual mission would be quite different from the one used in this study. 
Furthermore, due to the unique nature of the MDRS a degree of subjectivity was required in 
selecting probability values. Nevertheless the results from both HDA studies highlighted that 
the exhaust system was a critical component of the generator system in terms of reliability. 
This indicated that the „space ready‟ generator would require a different approach to the 
exhaust design. 
The overall design purpose of the MDRS is to provide a safe and reliable environment for 
astronauts. High reliability is critical for space systems due to the severity of the environment 
experience by both users and systems and the limited repair and reconfiguration options 
available during an actual mission. The FMECA approach combined with the HDA provides 
a closed loop system whereby risks (including those due to human factors) can be identified 
and then mitigated during the design process.  
One of the main advantages of the FMECA/HDA method is that it combines a relatively well 
understood method for assessing reliability with a relatively easy to implement extension 
dealing with human interaction which allows probematic parts to be easily identified at the 
design stage.  
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